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Abstract 
The core of this investigation is the low level of energy trade between China and Russia 
despite seemingly complementary goals. Despite China‟s large appetite for oil and gas 
imports, Russia is only a minor supplier instead the majority comes from far away suppliers 
in Africa and the Gulf. This is the starting point of the investigation to understand why a 
proximate supplier does not have a majority or at least the largest share in Chinese energy 
imports. The project has chosen the timeline of 1993-2012 because in 1993 China was no 
longer self-sufficient on domestic oil production and 2012 instead of 2013 to be able to 
procure complete data.             
 
The project implements Dale C. Copeland‟s theory of trade expectations to understand the 
obstacles to trading in between China and Russia. A critical realist ontological and 
epistemological position has been adopted in conjuncture with mixed methods.  
The investigation finds the following 5 critical aspects of Sino-Russian energy trade in the 
chosen period – Price, Infrastructure, Mistrust, Other Consumers/Suppliers and the use of Oil 
as Foreign Policy by Russia. Theses aspects help enhance reasoning when combined with 
trade expectations theory. The project concludes with the findings that the aforementioned 
factors created low trade expectations for Russian supply and the dependence levels were too 
risky for significant trade to occur between 1993 and 2012.     
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Problem Area 
China has been a global industrial powerhouse and this stature also means it has the large 
energy requirement of one. China was last self-sufficient on domestic oil production in 
1993(Downs in Bellacqua 2010:148 and (USEIA 2012), but since then it has grown to 
become the second largest energy consumer and the importer of oil in 2013 (IEA 2013). In 
contrast, its neighbour with whom it shares a 4000km long border is the world‟s second 
largest oil and natural-gas production.(Holtom et el 2011:28)   
China and Russia see eye-to-eye on many issues such as countering US hegemony and 
principles of non-interferences. The two countries also share other characteristics, such as 
their prominence in the world stage, large economy, vast territorial expanse, UN Security 
Council seats, long term domestic territorial issues in Chechnya and Taiwan & Tibet, 
detachment from the western power circle, shared view over multi-polar world order, to name 
a few. (Lo 2008:38) Despite the similarities and strong military trade accounting for 85% of 
China‟s total arm imports from 1992-2007 (Lotspeich in Ballacqua 2010:114), energy export 
from Russia only represented 6% of total Chinese energy imports. (Holtom et el 2011:28)     
This is a glaring gap between the arms and energy imports from Russia as it specialises in 
both and was capable of exporting 7.2 million oil barrels per day, in addition to its vast 
natural gas reserves.(USEIA 2013) This brings the question forward regarding why have the 
energy import levels remained so low, especially when 80% of Chinese energy import is 
consisted of African and Gulf exports (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:147). Such high volume 
import through seaways poses supply challenges to China, as the supply route are external to 
China‟s naval sphere, increase transportation costs and are subject to environmental 
conditions. (Ibid:151) 
Russian energy exports are comprised of 84% oil and 76% natural gas to Europe that are 
transported primarily through pipelines. (USEIA 2013) Although this dependence of Europe 
on Russian supply provides Russia with a steady customer, it also makes Russia weary by 
being dependent on select customers. This also brings in the stigma of Russia being Europe‟s 
energy appendage, when it wants to increase its importance politically.(Downs in Bellacqua 
2010:160 and Holtom et el 2011:33) Thus, “diversification of demand”, customers, is as 
much its interest as is “diversification of supply” for China. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:151) 
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Therefore, geographical proximity and compatible energy goals make Russia and China, on 
paper, almost natural partners in energy trading, but yet this is not reflected in two decades of 
energy trade with Russia claiming only 10% of energy imports, towards the end, while supply 
from farther areas remain dominant. This highlights the core interest of the project, which is 
to understand why Russian import shares of Chinese energy requirement have remained so 
low despite apparent common interests.  
This question is of importance to highlight the possibility of other factors in trading other 
than the simplification of supply and demand.  Therefore to understand this complexity, the 
project will be employing a Critical Realist (CR) ontology and epistemology in conjuncture 
with Dale C. Copeland‟s Theory of Trade Expectations. This investigation will attempt at 
showing the importance, if any, of Trade Expectation as outlined by Copeland in Sino-
Russian trade relations and uncover primary reasons contributing to the low level of imports 
from Russia through 1993 till 2012. Additionally it hopes to contribute to the understanding 
of the energy trade between Russia and China.  
Delimitations  
The investigation takes 1993 as its outset as this was the year after which China was no 
longer self-sufficient on its domestic oil production. 2012 was chosen to be able to gather 
complete data from the previous year rather than incomplete information at the time of 
writing. Although the investigation aims at a holistic approach, it is inevitable to look at 
certain instances either from Russia or China‟s perspective. This continues to the theory, 
where, sometimes, the consumer is more dominant in the choice of trade. In this project 
energy will be defined as oil and gas, and will be excluding coal, hydro, solar, and nuclear 
power. This was done to show the political-economic dimension behind the trade which is 
most present in oil and gas, as well as they are the biggest deficits of China‟s energy 
resources. China has the largest coal source and already has tapped hydro and nuclear power.    
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Problem Formulation 
Why has Russian oil imports trailed behind Gulf and African supply to China despite 
their proximity, during 1993-2012? 
Research Questions 
1. What are the energy related resource strengths and requirements of both the 
countries? 
2. What are the current energy trade volumes and trends? 
3. Whether there are any obstacles to energy trade, and if so what are they?  
Methodology 
Ontology & Epistemology – Critical Realism  
Critical realism (CR) is a stand point similar to positivism, whereby it acknowledges the 
existence of truth independent to individuals but also the fallible nature of positivist enquiry 
into reality. Although CR also views truth and reality to exist in one measurable form, but 
unlike the latter, realists acknowledge the difficulty of judging this reality.(Marsh and 
Furlong 2002:30)  For realists reality is external and independent of human consequences 
(Delanty and Strydom 2010:376), but discovering this reality requires social scientists to peel 
through various layers of reality to reach the emergent truth, making the path to observable 
truth harder and enables the possibility of various perspective of reality. (Ibid and Maxwell 
2012)   
A differentiating element in critical realism, from positivism or empiricism, is the role of the 
concept of “cause”. And, sees it playing a crucial role in the functioning of the real world. 
(Ibid) It believes in the structural dominance in reality, thus seeing causality as a factor in it. 
But, unlike positivism, they acknowledge that observation of such causal reality may not 
always be accessible.  This layered nature of reality, makes them believe that parts of the 
reality that cannot be observed but can be substituted with theoretical explanations. (Bryman 
2008:15) Realists see theory depicting actual features of the real word, thus giving 
researchers rules and tools to analyse the observable world. Critical Realists also take into 
account mental states and attributes as a part of the real world. (Maxwell 2012:8). 
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 As CR stems from Roy Bhaskar‟s work his views on human agency can also be seen in CR. 
Although not as strongly as constructivists, CR believes that humans have a degree of agency 
in reality but are constrained by structural factors. For an example, Bhaskar views culture as 
existing independent of individuals but is made possible by humans. (Clark in Given 
2008:169) In keeping with this Bhaskar introduced the three realms of reality to resolve 
epistemological issues and they are The Actual, The Real and The Empirical (Ibid:168). The 
actual domain refers to events that take place in the world, the real domain pertains to 
underlying structures and tendencies, and the empirical domain refers to the human element 
and its scientific inquiry. Thus, the objective reality is formed and caused by the interaction 
between the actual and real domains but its observation becomes fallible due to the empirical 
realm. (Ibid) 
Even though CR stands close to positivist epistemological considerations, qualitative research 
methods are in no way incompatible. Clark argues otherwise saying that qualitative research 
plays to the strengths of CR‟s perspective in understanding the complexity of an issue, rather 
than trying to simply it by controlling the data. Clark draws on qualitative research‟s focus on 
explanation and understanding agency and structure as its source of compatibility with CR. 
(Ibid:168p) Thus, from an epistemological standpoint both qualitative and quantitative are 
compatible with critical realism.       
Mixed Methods 
Creswell defines mixed methods as the following “Mixed methods research is a research 
design (or methodology) in which the researcher collects, analyzes, and mixes (integrates or 
connects) both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a multiphase program of 
inquiry.” Such a research strategy is meant to be a compromise between qualitative and 
quantitative methods, while combining them for a better understanding. (Wilson 2013:275) 
This approach is also compatible with the ontological and epistemological considerations in 
the project. As mentioned previously, despite the critical realism‟s affinity to quantitative 
data there is still room for qualitative data due to the included strengths. Thus, implementing 
them as a combination in this project is epistemologically sound.    
Mixed methods can be used for many purposes but the two dominant features are: increasing 
validity or gain a fuller and deeper understanding (Ibid:276) In this project a similar 
consideration has been taken during the choice of methods. The project will be relying on the 
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use of both qualitative and quantitative to be able to dissect the reality from various angles, in 
keeping with the realist view of reality. This multi-pronged approach will help in a more 
holistic understanding, so that we can reinforce statistics with political information and expert 
opinion, which would help in implementing our theories more effectively. The deeper 
understanding has been the bigger motivation in the choosing of mixed methods, even though 
the possible side effect of increased validity is welcomed.  
Such use of mixed methods is classified as “Completeness” by Bryman and is implemented 
with the motivation to further the understanding (Bryman 2008:612). In this project the data 
gathered will not come from focus groups and surveys, which are normally associated with 
mixed methods, rather secondary data. This secondary data will comprise of expert analysis, 
newspaper articles, official documents, and energy & trade reports, and cross referenced in a 
mixed methods manner. The selection of data will be guided through the parameters set 
according to the theory. 
  
Deduction 
Bryman simplifies deduction as a process in which a researcher deduces a hypothesis in a 
particular domain after theoretical considerations and available knowledge. This hypothesis is 
then tested using empirical evidence. (Bryman 2008:9)  Further adds that this hypothesis 
should also be able to be translated into operational terms. Thus, in conjuncture with theory 
the researcher must be able to collect data relating to the hypothesis (ibid). This research is 
followed but one characteristic of induction whereby researcher feeds back the knowledge 
gained and processes it using the stock theory to test the hypothesis. (ibid:9p)  
Such a description brings about a hierarchical model for deductive theory, which starts with 
Theory → Hypothesis → Data Collection → Findings → Hypothesis confirmation/rejection 
→ Revised theory (Ibid:10). This covers the rudimentary form of deduction, but Bryman 
stresses on the flexibility of this model. For starters, “theories” can be literature on a certain 
topic rather than a clearly defined theory. Secondly, the creation of hypothesis may not stem 
directly from the theory, may not be explicit and may change during the investigation. Thus, 
although the top down structure of Deduction remains one is not obliges to a particular 
model. (Ibid) 
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In this project, a deductive approach will be implemented for our findings to be tested against 
Dale Copeland‟s theory to understand the importance of trade expectations in Sino-Russian 
energy trade. There is no explicit hypothesis but the insinuation is that trade expectations, 
outline by Copeland, have had some effect on the low energy trade numbers. 
This is to be tested by first gathering data and then dissected using the perspective of trade 
expectations; therefore the project is designed to understand the reality by implementing 
theory to the data rather than proposing a new or opposing theory.                    
Data and Sources of Error   
The data selected in this project is mostly secondary data pertaining to statistics, trade figures, 
policy papers and expert opinion. Reliability, which is the trust worthiness of data (Seale 
1999), has been ensured by cross checking facts with multiple sources. Although this has 
been attempted to the maximum, there have been exceptions. Internal bias in the policy 
papers and expert opinion, has been given the same treatment and has helped adopt a more 
neutral and realistic tone in the project. Reliability issues have plagued trade and energy data, 
but the most credible sources, like the International Energy Agency, has been chosen in the 
presence of conflicting data. The cross referencing of quantitative data has also been 
attempted, but issues of publication date and absence of the most recent data has led to 
trusting credible sources. 
The choice of data has also been thought to be valid. Validity refers to the choice of measures 
chosen to research the problem formulation (Bryman 2008:151). Trade figures and opinions 
have helped understand the dynamics between the numbers and trade expectations. The 
choice of the data complements the theory well, and thus satisfaction has been achieved. But, 
the author has attempted to use the right measures in the discussion for the reader to grasp the 
actually picture. An example is Russia‟s ranking as the 4th largest oil supplier of China. When 
presented in this manner, it seems rather significant. But, if this is presented in terms of 
import share then it only represents 7.7% or 395,000 barrels of oil per day compared to Saudi 
Arabia‟s 19.7% share or 1 million barrels per day.  
Therefore both validity and reliability have been kept in mind during choosing the data as 
well as representing it.                        
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Theory of Trade Expectations (Copeland 1996) 
This chapter is designed to explain the Dale C. Copeland‟s theory chosen for this project. It is 
going to introduce the fundaments and reasoning behind trade expectations, as well as 
provide insight into how this theory will be implemented in the project. 
Copeland bases his theory on historical experiences with Germany and Japan in WWI & 
WWII. Both relied heavily on import of raw materials, despite attempts at self-sufficiency, 
and heavy dependence proved to a vital motivation to go to war. He iterates that liberal and 
realist reasoning behind motivations to war and trade only explain parts of both the World 
Wars but not the entire case, thus Dale C. Copeland incorporates the rationale of both the 
arguments coming from the two camps, while adding a crucial variable of “trade 
expectations”, in the understanding of consequences of economic dependence.  
Copeland draws on historical trends regarding Germany‟s motivation to go to war on both the 
occasions of World War I and II as his foundation for his theoretical claims. He highlights the 
high dependence of the country on imports of raw materials, but highlights that the 
motivation for war grew with higher protectionist tendencies of the exporting countries.  
Copeland therefore insinuates a significant connection between dependence on resources and 
the long term security of its supply.  
This historical evidence is seen in numerous occasions prior to both the world wars. In mid-
1890‟s, German goods was subjected to tariffs by the United States (US) and France and 
further invigorated by British and Canadian tariffs despite contradictory trade agreements 
made in 1865. (Copeland 1996:10) Around the same time Germany was also unable to 
provide raw materials for its domestic growth and had to rely on imports for 90% of its oil 
needs and 30% of iron ore (Ibid:11). According to Copeland, such level of dependency 
combined with dim forecasts for trade expectations can been seen as a motivation for 
initiating the First World War and possibly be seen even as a preventive war to maintain its 
resource supply.  
The same issues can be identified in Germany prior to the Second World War due to its 
smaller territorial spans and lack of a large imperial coverage. This is also documented in 
Adolf Hitler‟s vision of Lebensraum or Living Space for the growing German population and 
its food needs, combined with the need of raw materials. (Ibid:14) Similar tariffs curbed 
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German exports due to US protectionist treaty in 1930, driving import costs up and reducing 
foreign currency. All these economic pressures on Germany gave it further reason to secure 
its needs through war, initiating the Second World War. (Ibid:14p) 
This trend in Germany‟s history forms the basis of Copeland‟s theory. This highlights the 
discrepancy in Liberal and Realist explanation and show the need for a new variable. Thus, 
Copeland stresses on the importance of trade expectations rather than trade itself on the effect 
on relationship between countries.    
Copeland formulates the theory with two main proponents: Dependence level and Trade 
expectations. Therefore, not one or the other are sufficient for dependent trade, but both. The 
premier is related to the cost of adjusting ones economy to trade dependence and the latter 
refers to security of long term supply. 
Dependence level is calculated through a cost-benefit analysis. As an example, if country A 
has the GDP of 100 units at the outset and starts trading with country B, which results in a 
surplus of 10 units, it means that trade results in positive surplus. But, if Country A will lose 
20 units after it specialised for trade with Country B, its total dependence level will be 30 
units rather than 10 units. Therefore this analysis helps trading countries to asses risks before 
becoming dependent on the other. (Ibid:7)      
The theory, in summary, suggests that states will only trade if there is a surplus in total gains 
from trading compared to waging war. The understanding of this “gain” also takes into 
account the opportunity cost of trading i.e. the loss in domestic production a state suffers by 
specializing in exports it has competitive advantage and relinquishing sectors that have lower 
competitive advantage and replacing it with imports. (Ibid:7p) Then it further adds that these 
gains also have to be sustainable over a long period, thus the expectations of long term supply 
and access to markets also have to be assured for a country to participate in trading with 
another state and become dependent on it. (Ibid) Copeland adds that this benefit from trading 
is important even if there is no trade or little trade, but is significant due to the possible gains 
from expected high value trade. Thus, with low current trade the possibility of welfare being 
gained from peaceful trading offsets the motivation for war. (Ibid:7) 
Firstly, this theory accounts for the extreme reactions in the case of dependence, which is war 
or peace. Even though a realist view would propagate the legitimacy of war it is also 
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important to acknowledge the growing cost of war. Thus, in this project war is understood to 
be a variant of hostility than the absolute chance of war and even the motivation to not trade.  
Second, this theory is understood to act as an explanation to real world practice, in keeping 
with critical realist tradition, therefore the theory can be understood in both direction. This 
being established, in this project Sino-Russian dependence will not be studied using this 
theory, as there is none, but the lack of it will be scrutinised.          
The theory is intended to be used in reverse, which gives us the variables of trade 
expectations and possible dependence levels in helping us understand the absence of 
dependent trade from 1993-2012. Instead of applying Copeland‟s theory to two dependant 
countries and analysing whether peace or war should be expected, like in the case of 
Germany in the 2 world wars, it will be used to understand the absence of dependence by 
peaceful trading or at least low levels of trade between Russia and China. This facilitates the 
data collection process, which will be guided by the reverse direction and makes expectations 
and dependence levels the primary data targets.  
History and Background 
This chapter is intended to provide a concise history covering most topics so that the reader is 
primed with the understanding of the nature of Sino-Russian relationship. This is believed to 
be important in the accurate understanding of motivations in their energy trade  
Russia and China promoted their relationship as “Brothers Forever” in the heights of their 
relationship in the 1950s. (Wishnick 2001: 798).  But, despite this, Sino-Russian relations 
took a turn for the worse after Stalin‟s death leading to incompatible leadership and even 
culminating in the Sino-Russian split in 1959. This split is credited to the differences between 
Khruschev and Mao and lead to a hostile relationship lasting over decades and fuelling 
disputes in the border regions as well as China‟s reach to the US as a partner in the 1970s. 
(Ferdinand 2007: 842) 
Prior to 1959, one could have seen a different picture than the one during the split, the Soviet 
Union helped China craft their five-year plans, provided financing and provided technical and 
military aid.(Lüthi 2008:114ppp) And, such resurgence was seen intermittently but 
reconciliation was only seen in 1989 with Mikhail Gorbachev‟s visit to Beijing. Russia and 
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China historically suffered from disputes over border demarcation and this issue was 
magnified by their split. (Bellacqua 2010: 15).  Thus, after their 1989 reconciliation, 
resolving border disputes was a top priority. This was seen in Sino-Russian talks in 1991, 
followed by further discussion additionally with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. (Lo 
2008:29p) This increased communication between the two countries also marked a thaw in 
their relationship and soon materialised into annual summits held between the two countries 
during 1992-1999. (Ibid) This continued relationship also saw in the growth of their rhetoric 
regarding their relationship from “constructive partnership” to “determining the fate of the 
21
st
 century” and their communiqués soon included “anti-hegemonism”, “anti-unipolarity” 
and “multipolarity” as their shared interest against American hegemony grew. (Wishnick 
2001: 799 and Lo 2008:29) 
Apart from converging views on world order, China increasingly depended on Russian arms 
transfers, especially after the arms blockade put in place on it after the Tiananmen Square 
incident. (Wishnick 2001: 799) This large demand of arms also was beneficial, especially 
after the Soviet Union collapse, as it was helping fund a large sector that Russia was 
struggling to maintain and brought in valuable financing. This dependence led Russia to be 
willing to transfer technology to China, which was denied by many western suppliers. Russia 
transfers technical knowhow of the inter-continental fighter SU-27 in addition to various 
contracts and scientists. (Donaldson & Donaldson 2003: 715). It is however important to 
demonstrate the presence of mistrust or suspicion, as Russia was still selective about its 
military exports. It refused the export of Tu-22M, a supersonic bomber, to China while it did 
not hesitate to sell India the same equipment.(Bellacqua 2010: 6) Despite this Russian 
military equipment counted for 78% of total Chinese imports and represented a 
complementary relationship that allowed Russia to maintain its arms industry afloat while 
receiving the finances it needed and China was able to access technology and import arms 
that it was otherwise unable to. (Holtom et el. 2011: 4)                 
As mentioned above, border issues have been a constant splinter in Sino-Russian relations but 
with increased communication these tensions have de-escalated and mechanisms have been 
to put into place to resolve it. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance signed in 1950 was the symbol of such cooperation over border disputes, political 
and economic collaboration. But, due to the split, it was not renewed in 1979 when it expired. 
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The two countries since then have signed The Agreement on Confidence Building in 1996 to 
resolve border and military issues, leading to the creation of Shanghai Five along with other 
central Asian countries. (Jing-Dong 2010: 860). The following year Russia and China 
released a joint statement “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the 
Establishment of a New International Order” in April 1997 to reiterate their shared vision of 
the world order (Lo 2004: 295) and agreed on reducing military presence along the border 
(Jing-Dong 2010: 860). In 2001, the Shanghai Five was transformed into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. The same year The Treaty 
of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed as a sequel to the treaty 
from 1950 that was never renewed under the hostility of the split. (Wishnick 2001: 803) 
Apart from increased multilateral cooperation through the SCO, Russia and China took part 
in further collaboration in ASEAN & APEC (Wilhelmsen and Flikke 2001: 87). Apart from 
sharing similar policy on non-intervention and view on multi-polarity as the preferred world 
order,  Russia and China are engaged in the Korean peninsula, Iran, Arab Spring and recently 
in Libya and Syria. It has been observed that they support each other in the UN (Chung 2004: 
992) and is actively seen in their actions in the security council leading to less stringent 
sanctions on North Korea and Iran (Wishnick in Bellacqua 2010: 65pp).  
Despite such cooperation, cracks have surfaced intermittently due to the presence of The US. 
This was shown in Russia‟s support for the US‟s war or terror as well as limited objection by 
Russia in US‟s unilateral pull out from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). (Lo 
2008:51) This foreign influence on Sino-Russian relations is also seen when Russia decided 
to build the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline, supplying oil to both Japan 
and China, rather than a direct pipeline to China. There are also further issues with China‟s 
growing influence in the world and in Russia‟s sphere of influence, Central Asia. (Lo 
2004:308) Despite the SCO, Russia prefers to engage with Central Asia independently (Ibid) 
and they both have to compete for Central Asian energy resources. (Holtom et el 2011:35) 
Finally, there linger issues from their past regarding their roles. In the outset Russia had a 
superior standing but China‟s growing influence challenges such assumptions if not reverses 
it. Such cases of identity and status have been a theme even during cooperation.  
But, despite such disruptions the two countries have continued their interactions and held 
their first joint military exercise in 2005, followed by “The Year of China” and “The Year of 
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Russia” in 2006 & 2007 to promote each other to its citizens.  (Ferdinand 2007: 849pp) These 
efforts in convergence have borne fruit in resolving border disputes as they were said to be 
mostly resolved in an agreement in 2008 (Kutchins in Ballacqua 2010: 39) 
Trade has also benefitted from the better political relationship, which reflects in the US$56 
billion trade of 2008 compared to US$5.4 billion trade volume of 1995 (Lotspeich in 
Ballacqua 2010:101). In this bi-lateral trade, China still enjoys a trade surplus of US$9 billion 
(Ballacqua 2010: 7) and is the second largest importer of Russian goods, while Russia only 
features as the 9
th
 largest importer of Chinese goods. Of these Russian exports, mineral fuels 
(oil & gas) accounts for 52% followed by wood (12%), chemicals (9%) and base metals 
(7%). In contrast China exports textiles (19%), machinery (14%), electronics (16%), base 
metals (10%) and vehicles (9%). (Lotspeich in Ballacqua 2010:101pp) This shows some 
Russian anxiety over the trade imbalance and China‟s superiority in supplying finished 
goods, while Russia supplies the raw materials (Bellacqua 2010:7.). But, China‟s trade 
surplus can be effectively skewed with potential increase in energy trade, especially with the 
ESPO pipeline creating an important link between the two countries (BBC 2011). 
Russia is still in an advantageous position when it comes to its energy resources, as it had 
tried to pursue China to build a pipeline in the 1990s when the crude oil prices were low, but 
China stalled and were in no hurry due to the low market price for oil. Their main concerns, 
at the time, were expensive investments in pipeline infrastructure and negotiate prices even 
lower. This came to haunt China, with its increased energy needs combined with rising oil 
prices in the 2000s, while Russia established a strong consumer base in Europe. With this 
new situation, it brought about hesitance in Russia‟s part in long-term commitments with 
China. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:146-150)        
However, recently with the financial crisis and a dip in oil prices, helped the two countries to 
reach a settlement and sign a deal for a pipeline. The deal included US$ 25 billion loan from 
China in lieu of a 20-year supply commitment. This should dent the approximately 80% share 
of Gulf and African of Chinese oil supplies. As of 2006, China imported 8.6% of its total oil 
imports, and even though this is lower than other sources, it also marks the increase in 
volume from 1,000 barrels/day in 1995 to 292,000 barrels/day in 2007. (Ibid:147) 
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As an important part of the choice of the timeline for the project, China was last self-
sufficient, in matters of oil, in 1993 but now more than half of its oil demands are met but 
imports. (Ibid: 148). But, despite Russia‟s proximity to China it accounts for 11% while the 
rest are predominantly supplied by African and Gulf countries. This does pose as a logistical 
issue as transportation from such distances are unreliable and disruptable, and prior to the 
ESPO pipeline Russian oil was also transported by the railways that suffered from the same 
issues (Ibid: 151p). 
China‟s large demand serves as a perfect opportunity for Russia to obtain “security of 
demand” as it will not be only reliant on its European customers, helping it also maintain 
leverage on prices. And, Russia‟s energy resources help China in securing “security of 
Supply” when it is heavily reliant on few supplier that are far away. (Downs in Bellacqua 
2010:151) But, as of now these symbiotic goals haven‟t led to drastic increase in Russian oil 
supply and are not helped by mutual distrust, Chinese demands for lower prices and Russia‟s 
use of its resource as a foreign policy tool.  
Their shared history covers the spectrum from collaboration to hostility. There has been a 
constant development of their relationship in all most all spheres, but it is also worth noting 
the fragility of it in some cases. Experts reiterate that even though it may not be the strongest 
of bonds, they share a pragmatic relationship that both of the countries rely on when seen fit. 
(Bellacqua 2010:4) Some major obstacles that have emerged are the mutual distrust, lack of 
understand, Russia‟s affinity towards the West and its confusion over its Asian identity, 
resource nationalism and threat perception. Despite these both governments have been 
successful at resolving border disputes, form a stand in the international stage, propagate 
multi-polarity, and trade.      
Energy Trade 
This chapter is designed to first give the reader an understanding of Russia‟s resources and its 
energy market, then China‟s energy status, its requirements and sources, and finally an 
overview of their bi-lateral trade. These should mark the end of descriptive part, and will be 
followed by specific aspects that appear to hinder cooperation or at least not further them. 
They have be broken down to Prices, Other Customers/Suppliers, Priority, Infrastructure, 
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Mutual Understanding/Mistrust and Oil as Foreign Policy, and will be looked into in more 
depth to understand how they can contribute to Copeland‟s theory.  
Russia 
Russia is the world‟s second largest energy producer with its energy exports contributing 
50% of its federal budget and accounting for 70% of its total exports in 2012. It is estimated 
that Russia produced 10.4 million barrels(bbl)/day while it consumed only 3.2 million 
bbl/day, leaving 7.2 million bbl/day. ( US IEA) Russia uses oil only for 19% of its total 
energy needs while it relies on natural gas for 56% for the same. This is complimentary as it 
has the largest gas reserves can rely on it, while it can export the surplus oil for valuable 
income. This gives Russia an immense opportunity to exploit this resource for income and 
political leverage, which is also seen in Putin‟s vision of Russia as an “energy superpower” 
(Lo 2008:137).  
It currently has explored most of the cost efficient oil fields and predominantly originates in 
Western Siberia, while fields in the Russia Far East (RFE) accounted for only 3% of total 
production. Russia has deposits spread around 10 regions of which Western Siberia accounts 
for 62%, (USEIA 2013) but potential sites have been identified in Eastern Siberia, Caspian 
Sea, Sakhalin islands and the Russian Arctic. (Ibid)  When it comes to gas, Russia holds the 
largest gas reserves in the world and are mostly also located in Western Siberia. Apart from 
the existing fields, exploration in Yamal Peninsula, Eastern Siberia and Sakhalin Islands have 
been initiated. (Ibid)     
Much of this production is state controlled and carried out by public companies, while only 
state run companies are allowed to export this production. (Reuters 2013) Rosneft controls oil 
production, Gazprom has a monopoly on gas and Transneft controls most pipelines. (ibid)  
Despite liberalisation of the market, private and foreign companies have struggled to exist. 
Yukos, a private company, was taken over by state entities after tax fraud allegations and 
bankruptcy in 2003, BP‟s assets in its partnership with TNK were also sold to state-run 
companies in 2012, and foreign direct investment in energy companies from Western and 
Chinese sources have been limited. (Lotspeich in Ballacqua 2010:121) Despite this some 
private and foreign companies continue to exist, such as ExxonMobil, LUKoil and 
ConoccoPhillips. (Ibid) 
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As mentioned before, Russia thrives on energy exports. Europe serves as its biggest customer 
accounting for 84% compared to China‟s 5.5% share of total oil exports, although it is the 3rd 
biggest customer in a country based breakdown. Of these exports, 80% is transported using 
Transneft pipelines. (ibid) Russia has 9 major pipelines mostly to its west and with the 
capacity of around 2 million bbl/day, while the ESPO spur running from Skovorodino to 
Daqing started delivering China with .3 million bbl/day since January 2011 (ibid). Europe‟s 
significance as a consumer is also seen across gas exports, but China‟s presence is absolutely 
miniscule in this sector. Even though Russia relies more on gas than oil, it is still capable of 
exports that are mostly delivered to Western Europe and Turkey.  (ibid) 
This overview helps us gain key insights. First, due to relatively low domestic oil 
consumption Russia runs an oil surplus helping it export it while it can rely more on its 
immense gas reserves for domestic and foreign supply. Second, the state is closely tied to 
energy trades as most of the production and transportation is expedited by public companies. 
The energy market also comes across as restrictive to private and foreign entities. Third, most 
of Russia‟s exports and the infrastructure around it are geared mostly towards Europe with a 
growing prominence of Asian customers.  
China 
China is the world‟s second largest energy consumer and importer. Chinese energy 
consumption is comprised of coal (70%), oil (19%), hydroelectricity (6%) and gas (4%). 
Despite the low share of energy contribution, its oil consumption levels were close to 10 
million bbl/day while its domestic production was around 4.1 million bbl/day, mostly 
consumed by the transportation sector. (USEIA 2012) This has left China with a large energy 
deficit that it fulfils through oil imports. China is also the largest coal producer and consumer, 
with 70% of its energy requirements fulfilled by it. Despite its large reserves, it has also 
become a net importer of coal since 2009. China is not too reliant on gas imports or its 
consumption as it only accounts for 4% of energy production, but its use has been gradually 
growing and again imports exceeded domestic production in 2007. The use of this form of 
energy is predicted to exponentially increase due to its cleaner nature versus coal, potentially 
meaning further energy reliance on imports. (Ibid) 
Its current oil suppliers consist primarily of Gulf and African countries. Saudi Arabia, Angola 
and Iran were the largest suppliers providing China with more than 2 million bbl/day while 
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Russia was fourth with its supply of 395 thousand bbl/day in 2011. Middle Eastern supply 
has been consistently strong since 1995 till 2008 averaging around 50% of total imports, 
while Russian supply has increased from 0.2% in 1995 to around 7.7% in 2011 with a peak of 
10% in between. (Ibid)  
Following are a the details about the major suppliers 
Saudi Arabia: Strengthening of Chinese and Saudi Arabian ties has also translated into 
increased oil imports. In 1995 Saudi Arabia contributed 2% of total imports (Lai 2007: 523) 
but by 2011 it has increased to 19% (USEIA 2012). Apart from increased trade, Sinopec, a 
Chinese oil company, has gained rights to explore gas basins in Saudi Arabia, as well as 
technical help from Saudi Arabia in building stockpiles and refineries in China (Lai 
2007:523) These imports are transported through sea ways, passing through the Strait of 
Malacca.  
Iran: The second largest oil producer in the Middle East is also a significant importer for 
China. It supplied 11% of all Chinese oil imports in 2011 and showed a similar growth as 
Saudi Arabia as it only accounted for 5% of these imports in 1995. Mr. Lai observes that Iran 
and China have shared a strong diplomatic relationship with regular visits. Even here Sinopec 
struck a 30 year gas deal along with development of oil fields in 2004, apart from a 25 year 
oil supply deal between the 2 countries (ibid). These imports are also transported via Strait of 
Malacca and are disruptable due to the sea ways.  
Angola: Unlike Russia and Middle East, foreign direct investments (FDI) are welcomed in 
the oil sector in Africa. This has been a boon for China as it has heavily invested in this 
market and has forged storing diplomatic ties. China and Angola have had diplomatic ties 
since 1983 and have blossomed since the mid-1990s with frequent leadership visits. China 
has helped build low cost housing as well as waved all dues prior to 1999. With these strong 
ties, Angola has gradually increased in ranking as an oil exporter to China, supplying almost 
12% of total imports in 2011 versus the 5.9% in 1995. China has also purchased an oil field 
in Angola. Similar to Iranian and Saudi Arabian supply, Angola‟s supply must also be 
shipped. (Lai 2007:525p) 
Russia: Due to disruptions through sea transportation, China is more and more looking 
towards Central Asia. China and Russia have been working on forging stringier ties and it has 
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seen an impact on oil trade with Russia‟s share increasing from 0.2% in 1995 (Ibid: 523) to 
7.7% in 2011 (USEIA 2012). It has also climbed the supplier‟s ranking from being the 7th 
largest supplier in 2003 to the 4
th
 largest in 2011. Most of these supplies were transported 
using railways apart from 2011 onwards with the completion of the spur from the ESPO 
pipeline. 
Since the 1990s, the two countries have been in discussion over the construction of an oil 
pipeline to China. In 2004 the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao promised to invest in the Russian 
energy sector and supporting Russia‟s membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
in return of expanding oil exports and creation of  the trans-Siberian pipeline. (Lai 2007: 526) 
The creation of a direct trans-Siberian pipeline to China was overruled in favour of the ESPO 
pipeline going to the Pacific coast with a spur to China. This was partly motivated by 
Japanese interests. But, despite the competition, China had invested a total of USD 25 billion 
in Rosneft and Transneft ini return for a 20 year oil supply deal. (Downs in Bellaqua 
2010:147)  
Kazakhstan: It is the 9
th
 biggest oil supplier with a 4.4% import share in 2011. Kazakhstan 
and China have had an active energy relationship with China investing USD 3 billion for a 
pipeline running between the two countries. Chinese companies have also acquired stakes or 
mergers in Altobemunaigaz and PetroKazakhstan giving it access to substantial oil reserves. 
(Lai 2007:527)  
As China is reliant on foreign supply, most of its major oil companies like Sinopec, CNPC, 
and CNOOC hold stakes or have acquired overseas resources and companies. Records dating 
back from 1993 show all the three companies above being involved around the globe. 
CNOOC has holdings in Australia, Indonesia, Canada, Africa, Norway and Qatar. Sinopec 
has holdings in South America , Canada and one each in Kazakhstan and Russia. CNPC has 
the largest portfolio with interests in South America, Africa, Middle East, Central Asia and 
one in Russia. (Bergsager :11p) China also has lent some energy backed loans (EBL) and 
predominantly in Central Asia, including Russia, and South America. 
This overview shows that China imports various forms of energy, even though it has an 
abundant reserve of its main source, coal. Even though oil accounts for 19% (USEIA 2012) 
of its energy requirements and this sounds low, China is the second largest consumer and 
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importer of oil. Its oil imports are varied by country but are predominantly based in either the 
Gulf or Africa, this means more than 75% of its imports are transported through sea ways 
which is not ideal for China due to disruptions. Although china has many suppliers Saudi 
Arabia, Angola and Iran are quite significant as they supply more than half of the total 
imports. Apart from them Russia and Kazakhstan are emerging as important suppliers due to 
their proximity and newly established pipelines. This foreign dependence has also seen China 
diversify its energy holding around the world. 
Bilateral Energy Trade 
As mentioned earlier, Russia and China are a perfect fit on paper and despite stressing on the 
low levels of energy trade, it has to be mentioned that they haven‟t been absent. Russian 
imports to China has steadily grown and significantly from the 0.2% of import share to 10% 
in 2005 and 7.7% as off 2011. In terms of numbers this increase translates to 292,000 bbl/day 
in 2007 compared to only 1000 bbl/day.  (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:147)  
Sino-Russian trade has always included oil, but it has only been post 2002 that its share of 
total Russian exports reached double digits. Data shows that in 2008, oil accounted for 52% 
of the total Russian exports to China. (Lotspeich in Ballacqua 2010:101) It has been evident 
that energy trade captures the mutual interest of both the countries. One has it and the other 
needs. And, this has been acknowledged by both the countries in their discussions of 
constructing pipelines since the 1990s.  
Before continuing further it must be established the price nature of energy trade, it averaged 
around USD 14/bbl in 1998 which increased to over USD 72 in 2007 (Down:154) and around 
USD 97/bbl at the time of writing. This fluctuation in price is a big factor in Russian and 
Chinese discussions as the negotiating advantage can shift between the buyer and seller 
depending on the price. 
Discussions for both oil and gas pipelines were initiated by the Russians in the 1990s due to 
the low oil prices, but then China was more concerned about stalling and gaining price 
concessions as they had an advantage. Price hikes were not predicted and as Russia was 
selling oil at the global price, it was in no hurry. Another hindrance was the investment costs 
relating to the pipelines as the infrastructure was not already present and would mean more 
capital involvement. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:154) Even though China was no longer self-
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sufficient on its domestic oil production, it was not too concerned with gas supplies as it 
could not absorb levels imported through pipelines in the 90s and has only recently started to 
import gas (Ibid). Russia had interestingly also offered a 10% stake in Russian Petroleum to 
CNPC, but was turned down as Russia was thought of as a risky investment and eventually 
was bought by BP instead. (Ibid)    
This relaxed attitude of China towards securing energy suppliers was reversed with 
increasing oil prices, but by then Russia‟s interests started to wane as its resource nationalism 
started growing and a thriving market in Europe. This price increase changed the market to a 
seller‟s from a buyer‟s. This made it harder for China gain leverage on price concessions. 
(Ibid:155) Also, with time Russia was losing interest in the initial pipeline proposal of 
Angarsk-Daqing that would connect the two countries. Although it is argued that this pipeline 
is economically more viable, cheaper, logistically sound and better capacity, Russia wanted a 
longer pipeline to Nakhodka giving it access to the Pacific coast along with Japan and South 
Korea (Lo 2004:303). This is partly due to its experience with Turkey and its leverage with 
the Blue Stream pipeline as it was the primary recipient and did not want the same with 
China‟s aggressive price negotiations (Ibid). Another reason for the change of heart is 
credited to the fact that the main beneficiary of the first proposal would be Yukos, the largest 
private oil company before its collapse, and this was not appreciated as they wanted tighter 
government control over its resources. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:155) And, finally Japanese 
lobbying and financing was the nail in the coffin for the Angarsk proposal (Ibid:152). 
Therefore the ESPO pipeline was selected to be built to its eastern coast with a spur of .3 
million bbl/day capacity linking it to China. China then provided USD 25 billion to Rosneft 
and Transneft soft loans with favourable interest rates in return for a 20 year supply deal. 
Although the pipeline is being built in stages, the Daqing spur opened in January 2011 and 
has been operational since.   
The new pipeline creates better infrastructure for energy trade compared to railways, which 
was expensive and disruptable, therefore gave no advantage over the sea transportation by 
China‟s biggest suppliers. Despite this supply still has been relatively low, translating into 
395,000 bbl/day in 2011 compared to Saudi Arabia‟s 1 million bbl/day in the same period. 
(USEIA 2012)  
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As for gas pipelines negotiations are on-going and a 4000km pipeline has been proposed, 
which could supply China with 20 bcm/year and 10 bcm to South Korea. (Holtom et el 
2011:33) But, similarly price negotiations have held back progress. China has been adamant 
in prices matching its domestic coal prices, which are 40% cheaper than what the European 
customers for the same gas. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010: ) China has also been able to 
diversify its gas source by importing from Australia, Qatar and Central Asian countries, 
giving it further advantage.  
Therefore even though energy trade has become a large part of Sino-Russian bilateral trade, it 
can be seen as a mere natural increase matching international trends. Russia for a long time 
tried pursuing an oil pipeline but due the missed opportunity relevant infrastructure has not 
been developed until recently. This has heavily contributed to the low energy trade as the 
only alternate is railways, which does not hold too many advantages over seaways as it is 
equally unreliable and disruptable.  
Above I have briefly described the existing trade status between the two countries to bring to 
context the biggest factors. But, below will be discussing these factors. First we will be 
describing them in depth and then discuss them in conjuncture with the theory of choice.                          
Analysis        
Prices 
Price negotiations have been a constant factor in both oil and gas deals and have hindered 
progress. China has constantly asked for price concessions and has offered up to 40% lower 
than what Russia receives from its European consumers.(Downs in Bellacqua 2010:156) 
China maintains to follow a pricing model tied to its coal prices as it argues Russia has lower 
costs in dealing with China, whereas Russia insists on prices tied to oil and similar to the ones 
paid by its European customers.(Bersager 2012:8) 
Prior to the pipelines, rail and sea transportation of oil to China were the only alternatives but 
were viable only when prices were high as railways costs Russian suppliers three times as 
much as pipelines (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:152) Therefore from the Russian side, trading 
with China make most sense when global prices are high because it would not be feasible to 
divert European bound oil to China when European customers paid more and was easier and 
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cheaper to transport the oil. Whereas the high transportation cost and little concession on 
prices do not make Russian supply any more attractive to the Chinese than Gulf or African 
sources.    
Taking everything as equal, this poses as a problem loop because if neither party is willing to 
compromise on price, then Russian companies will not be able to trade and raise capital for 
infrastructure investment and without proper infrastructure it would not be able to provide 
China with cheaper prices. (Holtom 2012:35)    
Even with completed deals, price issues have still crept up. Two months after the ESPO spur 
completion, Rosneft accused China of unilaterally cutting prices and threatened it with legal 
action (Holtom et el 2011:31). This exposes fundamental differences between the two as 
Russia is used to steady and high prices from its European customers while China expects 
preferential treatment and puts long term commitments under strain when global prices 
fluctuate. Such fluctuation can make China rethink its USD 25 billion investments in Russian 
oil and Russia might be unwilling to trade if the ESPO blend‟s price falls relative to the 
European rates. (Holtom et el 2011:31)    
From Copeland‟s perspective this brings in a major issue of reliability. The price modelling 
of the two countries seem incompatible to a large degree, therefore even after the completion 
of deals price fluctuation can put long term deals under stress. As both the countries are not 
completely reliant on each other and represent only a fraction of total import/exports, they are 
more likely to back out or want to change deals. This is addressed in the mistrust sub-section 
below, but simply put it brings in reliability issues in long term deals. Such insecurity heavily 
impacts trade expectations. Copeland‟s theory is fundamentally rooted in the argument that 
foreseeable stable long-term deals are essential to peaceful dependant trading, but due to the 
insecurity brought in by the price pressure such trade security is hard to achieve. 
This volatile nature of the oil market combined with aggressive price negotiations can partly 
explain why oil trade values between the two have been so low, and lagging behind other 
partners, in the past two decades. This is especially so with older infrastructure and prior to 
the 2011 opening of the pipeline. The railways simply did not add any advantage in trading, 
instead increased costs, which was core to the issue of negotiating deals.  
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China‟s demand for lower prices also has an effect on the perceived dependence level for 
Russia. Since, China is a net importer of oil, any increase in supply helps affect its 
dependence level positively, especially with its large number of suppliers. But, for Russia, 
exports to China require investments in infrastructure, possibility of disrupting European 
supplies and accepting lower prices. These all seem to have a negative impact on Russia‟s 
dependence level with China.  
If we say that Russia starts with 110units and then gains 20units for trading with China, but 
loses 5units in European sales and loses 2 units due to lower prices. Therefore the total 
dependence level would be 27units, so if they trade Russia could be enjoying a surplus of 
13units adding to 123 units in total, but severing of trade would lead to Russia losing 25 units 
and bringing its total value post severing to 85units. Of course, during trading the surplus is 
beneficial for Russia but the opportunity cost is also quite high. And with a risky dependence 
level, low trade expectations cannot further trade. Although this is just a simple illustration 
and the values are speculative, they are inspired by the data. This can serve as additional 
reasoning behind low trade during 1993-2012.                     
Other Customers/Suppliers 
Another dimension that is forgotten in the discussion is the existence of other customers and 
suppliers. It has already been detailed above the various sources both Russia and China have 
as energy partners apart from each other. Although in a country breakdown Germany leads 
the charts while China features as Russia‟s 3rd largest energy partner and Russia is China‟s 4th 
largest supplier in 2011-2012. These rankings do look promising but the cumulative supply to 
Europe comprises of 84% of the total Russia oil exports, where as China accounts for roughly 
6% of the same share. A similar pattern is seen with Chinese imports that get the bulk of it 
from the Gulf and Africa and the Russian contribution accounts for only about 7.7%. (USEIA 
2012) 
The presence of so many suppliers and consumers can also been seen as a hindrance, 
especially for Russia due to capacity and infrastructure limits combined with long term 
commitments making it harder to commit higher supplies to China. Although China still 
would like oil from Russia, they have better investments and long term partnership with 
countries like Iran and Angola, which makes it easier to obtain larger volumes due to the 
established relationship and infrastructure towards China.      
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Gas is a bit different because although Russia supplies Europe with gas, it is dominated by 
Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Turkey. (USEIA 2013) These means that 
Russia has, by slightly, fewer clients to rely on and being European countries their 
consumption has stagnated and may decrease due to efficiency reforms.(EuroStat 2012) The 
other big consumer is Turkey, but Russia has a harder time extracting European level prices 
as the Blue Stream pipeline makes it the primary consumer which means better leverage. (Lo 
2004:303) With these elements in mind combined with Russia‟s vast reserves, China is a 
more attractive client when it comes to gas. But, again China has diversified its sources and 
primarily from Australia, Iran and Qatar (Holtom 2012:35). It has also recently secured deals 
with many of the central Asian countries, breaking Russia‟s monopoly of gas supply in the 
region. (Ibid) It has secured a 30bcm supply deal until 2030 with Turkmenistan, which is half 
of China‟s current demand. Another gas pipeline from Kazakhstan will be supplying China 
with 5-10bcm of gas annually. In 2010, China secured Uzbekistan to supply it with 10bcm of 
natural gas annually and expects 13bcm from China‟s pipeline with Myanmar.(Ibid) 
Meanwhile, the 2 agreed gas pipelines in 2006 still have not materialised or construction 
started. All of these combined have decreased Russia‟s advantage and currently China is 
trying to take advantage of it by offering only USD 100 per 1000 cubic meters versus the 
USD 350 that Europe pays. (Lo 2008:149)                
Priority 
Price 
Another aspect of having such a large number of customers and suppliers is the importance of 
each country. Russia has been an energy supplier to Europe for decades and has the 
infrastructure in place to provide them and in return Russia enjoys high prices, or at least 
market prices, for both oil and gas. Therefore, Europe is automatically favoured. Similar 
competition is seen even with the ESPO blend prices as Japan, US, and South Korea which 
buys 60% of the capacity at a USD 5 premium per barrel compared to China‟s price. (RIA 
2012) Thus, despite China‟s demands of consuming the full capacity, even here other 
countries are favoured due to profit incentives, and China‟s reliability is not helped when 
CNPC unilaterally cut prices in 2011. (Ibid and Holtom et el. 2011:31) 
China also perceives that Russia prefers western companies and investments over Chinese 
ones, due to its negative experiences when attempting to cooperate. This has lent to the 
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notion that Russia looks to China only when capital is required leading to unequal 
partnership.( Holtom et el 2011:36) 
The buyer vs seller market is another reason for priority unevenness. China is only attractive 
to Russia when prices are high, at least with the rail transportation being the only 
infrastructure. Whereas China would see cheaper prices as the main attraction because 
otherwise it would be comparable to its existing suppliers further away.      
Gas vs Oil  
Due to Russia‟s commitments in Europe it is harder for it commit to higher volumes of oil to 
China, but because of stagnating gas demands in Europe Russia wants to diversify quickly. 
This is seen in Russia‟s attempt at pushing gas to China more than oil. One can see the 
priority mismatch when China wants to buy oil, Russia wants to sell it gas (Lo 2008:134) 
This is another hindrance and a clear sign that Russia can supply gas, but oil may be harder.   
The European consumer base is quite large and profitable but it also makes Russia more 
dependent on it. If we take the previous example of dependence, we take Russia‟s current 
level at 110units with European trading, but the infrastructure (10) and trade account (20) for 
30units. So if Europe stops trading with Russia, it will decrease to 80 units and the entire 
infrastructure will be useless even though Russia could make up the European trading units 
(20) by trading with Asia or shipping exports. This would further mean more investments. 
This dependence with Europe exhibits Russia‟s inability to alienate Europe and the 
importance to keep it satisfied. Of course the above is an extreme scenario, and trading with 
China will not result to such extreme consequences, but Russia will have to be able to trade 
with China without disrupting European supplies, which some experts doubt (see 
infrastructure sub-section). This dependence and the importance of it, also acts as an indicator 
for China to understand trade expectations from Russia. Due to the importance of supply to 
Europe being so high, and doubts over Russia‟s supply capacity, trade expectations for China 
automatically are not too positive. 
Adding to this argument are the factors of price and resource capacity. As highlighted above, 
it is favourable for Russia to supply Europe, Japan, the U.S and South Korea over China due 
to its profitability. And, Russia is already showing signs of its capacity by trying to push gas 
than oil to China, exposing further weakness in trade expectations for China.  
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With such high levels of dependence on Europe and questionable capacity of Russia, the low 
trade expectation for oil trade with China is evident. With Copeland arguing for strong trade 
expectation for trade to occur, the low trade levels between 1993 and 2012 can be explained 
by the dim trade expectation between Russia and China due to Europe‟s importance.      
    
Mutual Misunderstanding and Mistrust 
There is a large gap between business practices between the Chinese and the Russians. One 
of the most evident examples is China‟s willingness to construct pipelines without supply 
deals and its expectation of Russia to do the same. Just as China started constructing the 
West-East Natural Gas pipeline and Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline without firm supply deals, 
it was comfortable constructing the spur to the ESPO pipeline before the deal was finalised 
while Rosneft insisted on finalising the deal before any construction began. (Downs in 
Bellacqua 2010:163) 
Apart from business practices, there is a larger weariness over decision making in the Russian 
energy market. This is captured in the following quote by Zhang Guobao, the Vice-Minister 
of National Development and Reform Comminsion “One moment Russia is saying they have 
made a decision, the next saying that no decision has been made. To date, there has been no 
correct information…just like weather forecasts” (Lo 2008:132) and further goes on to say 
“We don’t know who can make decisions” (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:163) This opaqueness 
combined with inaccessibility through FDI foster misunderstandings among the two 
countries. Such uncertainty is not helped by the perception that Russia takes part in “legal 
nihilism” (Holtom 2012:32) and that “Russia always finds all kinds of ways to terminate or 
alter contracts and change laws unexpectedly” (Ibid) Such lack of transparency is a major 
obstacle to Chinese cooperation in Russia. (Ibid)      
Upstream investments in foreign supply helps China be secure about its supply as well as 
profit from it, like it has done primarily in Latin America and Africa as well as Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. The bureaucratic obstacles to upstream investments in Russia have proven to be quite 
strong on previous attempts. Previous unpleasant experience has fuelled Chinese beliefs that 
the Russian energy market is restrictive and tightly controlled.  
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In 2002, CNPC tried to gain controlling shares in Slavneft, a Russian oil company, but failed 
because parliamentarians thought of it to be against national interest. Despite offering USD 3 
billion for 74.59%, it was unable to buy stakes and eventually the company was sold to a 
Russian company for just USD 1.86 Billion. (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:162p) Sinopec‟s 
cooperation with Yukos, once the largest private oil company, was disrupted when it was 
charged with fraud and later collapsed. This was seen as the Government targeting the private 
company as it was a threat to the state run companies (Lo 2008:144). Rosneft and Sinopec‟s 
joint exploration of Sakhalin ended with Sinopec‟s withdrawal in 2005 after it used millions 
to no avail. (Holtom et el 2011:37) China-Rus Energy Investment Limited had gained 51% 
stake in Suntarneftegaz that held exploration licenses in East Siberia, but even this venture 
came to a screeching halt when a rival company charged it with fraud and exposed that its 
licenses were terminated. (Holtom et el 2011:37)  
Such experiences make it harder for the Chinese to understand the process in Russia and the 
reliability of the industry. In some cases, it also affects the morale and questions the nature of 
the partnership. This is seen in Chinese analysts perception of Russia “Russian energy 
companies are only willing to cooperate when they need capital” (Ibid:36). This has also 
brought up beliefs that Chinese companies and their investments are not as prioritised as the 
ones from Western companies (Ibid:32)     
The opaqueness of the Russian energy sector makes it hard for the Chinese to gauge the 
processes and its progress. The pipeline deal was largely delayed by due to the government 
decision making, apart from price negotiations. But, frustrations over the pipeline can be seen 
from the Chinese perspective in the quote mentioned above. Such difficulty in measuring 
supply and the progress of it makes it hard for consumer to be secure about long term supply. 
The same plagues China‟s understanding of trade expectations from Russia. In addition to 
this, the difficulty of Chinese companies to get involved in the upstream activities, through 
FDI, like drilling and exploration blinds Chinese understanding further. To begin with the 
Russian decision making is unclear, on top of that the Chinese are unable to join the process 
which makes measuring the trade expectation much harder.  
Copeland mentions that trade expectations are important even when trade is low or non-
existent, as it can foster future partnerships. Apart from hindering progress in the last two 
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decades, this opaqueness makes China question long term deals in the future with Russia as it 
is insecure about them.  
The tight control over the energy market and difficulties of Chinese companies getting 
involved also has its effects on the possible dependence level. To illustrate this, we assume 
China starts with a 100 units before trading with Russia. Trade brings in 10 units of benefit to 
China, but if it also controlled upstream assets, then China would be able to gain an 
additional 5 units of gain. This investment in upstream activities help China secure trade 
expectations as well as help efficiency and explorations, which may lead to an additional 
surplus of 5 units. Therefore, China would gain 20 units if it was allowed to participate in 
upstream activities along with trading, but since it has had such difficulties in the past 2 
decades the trading benefit remains only 10 units. We can compare this to the situation in 
Angola, China‟s 2nd largest oil source, where apart from gaining 10units from trading China 
also has investments gaining it the same 10 units. Thus, the total gain with Angola is 20 units 
compared to Russia‟s 10 units.  
Thus the above is a clear example that Russia‟s closed energy market hinders China‟s 
possibility of a higher surplus and the opaqueness makes securing trade expectations harder. 
Therefore, in comparison with a supplier like Angola or Iran, Russia might not seem as 
attractive from Copeland‟s perspective.                   
Infrastructure 
Despite vast energy reserves Russia is unable to properly serve to Asia due to the lack of 
proper infrastructure. Apart from pipelines, railroads are the only alternative, but they drive 
up costs by 3 times of pipeline transportation costs. Russia has 9 pipelines, but only one 
towards the pacific. This lack of cost efficient infrastructure has been a major hindrance to 
supplying Asia and China with more oil. As off 2011, Asia accounted for only 18% of 
Russia‟s total energy exports. (USEIA 2013)   
But, apart from the transportation constraints, experts also question the capacity of Russian 
fields. Even though the West Siberian fields are explored and vast, they are mostly geared 
towards Europe, therefore more explorations in the eastern region must be conducted. But, it 
is supposed to come at the cost of USD 8.5 billion. (Holtom 2012:31)  Experts say that 
Russia will not be able to increase its supply to China by large margins without putting 
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European supply at risk, if it does not explore the eastern fields. (ibid)  New exploration and 
equipment is expensive and requires large capital invests that Russia is does not have or is 
unwilling to dispense of. (Ibid:35)  The unprofitability can be seen in the cost of drilling in 
certain parts of Russia where it costs Exxon Mobil as much as USD 26.94/bbl where as it 
drills for as little as USD 3.74/bbl in other parts of Asia. (Bloomberg 2013) Moreover, there 
haven‟t been any new oil fields discovered in the past decade (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:150)   
Also, as highlighted above due to FDI constraints in the energy sector foreign technology and 
capital needed to carry out such explorations is limited, thus bringing further questions about 
Russia‟s capability of harnessing its vast energy resources. (Holtom 2012:31)    
Although Russia is the second largest oil producer, many have questioned its capacity and the 
availability of cost-efficient fields. Even though some unexplored fields exist the investment 
needed and the high costs of drilling are seen as obstacles to increased capacity, anytime 
soon. This is a clear negative impact on trade expectations for China. With speculation of 
limited capacity and Sinopec‟s experience with unfruitful explorations, the perceived trade 
expectations from China will be low. This again argues for why the trade levels have been 
low but also contributes to China‟s future intentions with Russian supply.        
 
Oil as Foreign Policy  
Russia‟s immense energy sources help economically but due to the tight government control 
also helps in foreign policy matters and power projection. (Lo 2008:138p) Putin has already 
outlined his vision for Russia to be an energy super power and not just a supplier. This brings 
us to the first concern of Russia. It does not want to be seen as an energy appendage, either to 
Europe or China (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:160)  But, with 84% reliance on Europe it wants 
to use its resources for closer ties than just a supplier. Similar thought plagues Russia‟s 
involvement in China, and therefore it is weary of being dependant on Chinese consumption 
as its economic growth can eclipse Russian standing. This can be seen Russia‟s choice in the 
ESPO route to gain access to Japan and South Korea and not be completely tied to China. 
The choosing of the ESPO route was also seen as leverage in better ties with the Japanese, 
although that did not seem to bear fruit. (Lo 2008: 144) Thus, Russia‟s greater ambitions, 
marginally, influence its choice of consumers and not necessarily on market forces. 
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Russia‟s use of its energy as power projection instils a sense of unreliability. Mostly caused 
by the disputes with Ukraine from 2005-2009 and the disruptions caused by it. Even though 
the disputes were financial, it is believed that Russia tried to use the opportunity to project 
power. (Lo 2008: 139p)This dual nature of the resource comes as a worrying factor for 
dependant countries on its reliability.  
With growing importance of energy, Russia has also started showing signs of resources 
nationalism (Downs in Bellacqua 2010:160). Its liberalised market post-soviet collapse has 
been steadily turned into a tightly controlled sector. The largest private oil company, Yukos, 
was said to have been a target of the government and collapsed in 2004 under fraud charges. 
Since, then most of the energy trade is controlled by the state monopolies- Rosneft, Transneft 
and Gazprom. This nationalism has also brought in the above concerns over being an energy 
appendage and also fuelling China‟s threating growth.      
Furthermore, due to Russia‟s reliance on European consumers it needs to diversify its 
demands and sees ample opportunity in China in doing so. Having China as a stable customer 
can ensure leverage in negotiations with European consumers. But, this also adds additional 
pressure with political consequences if China were to be actively or passively involved in 
such a situation. Questionable reliability combined with the possibility of getting caught in 
between Russian and European conflicts could be an additional explanation to China‟s 
hesitance in dependant energy trade with Russia, explaining the low import levels. 
Russia‟s use of energy as more than a commodity brings in reliability concerns. The same 
concerns were flagged during the disruptions caused by disputes with Russia. Treating oil as 
a foreign policy tool also has its effect on decision such as the construction of the ESPO 
pipeline, rather than the direct one. This choice compromised with the long term supply and 
capacity of supply to China. If Russia is expected to account for more variables than price 
and supply, it makes it slightly unreliable to consumers.  
This unreliability brought in by resource nationalism affects trade expectations negatively for 
China as it is also dependent on the surrounding countries and Russia‟s foreign policy 
decisions. This in part can explain the absence of high volume trade between 1993 and 2012.     
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Discussion 
Therefore, we can see that the sections above have detailed the possible obstacles to 
increased trade during 1993-2012, and with some theoretical context. From the history and 
the analysis, it is clear that price has been a large factor in creating a volatile partnership. 
Price has acted as an obstacle to sealing deals as well as straining it after completion. The 
market volatility combined with constant Chinese requests for concessions have strained 
relationships. The gas and oil pipeline delays, at least in the beginning, can be credited to 
unreasonable Chinese demands for price. This has created heavy unreliability over long term 
deals, affecting trade expectations and decreasing Russian motivation for cooperation. The 
issues stemming from prices are magnified by the lack of infrastructure geared for China. 
Throughout most of 1993-2012 railways has been the only mode of transportation, until the 
pipeline in 2011. This has meant that the cost of transportation has remained high, making it 
viable to trade only when the global oil prices are high. This is seen in 2005 when oil prices 
shot up to USD 51.7/bbl, this is also the same year when Russian share of imports was the 
highest (11%). Such an unstable incentive to trade has not been fruitful in the last two 
decades, as the interest of the seller is in direct conflict with the buyer‟s interests. It is also a 
paradoxical situation because the prices can only be lowered though investment in 
infrastructure, but without the extra income from sales to China these investments cannot be 
made.       
Trade expectations have been further damaged by the absence in recent and cost effective 
explorations. As most of the West Siberian fields have been explored and supply Europe, 
more exploration needs to be done in the Russian Far East to be able to supply China and the 
Pacific Coast. Such explorations have been thought too expensive without investment in 
equipment, which Russian companies do not have the capital for. Thus, the European market 
seemed to be the most convenient one between 1993 and 2012. This lack of motivation on the 
Russian‟s part damaged the trade expectations for a long term supply to China making it look 
to other suppliers.  
Mistrust has emerged as another big factor in negative trade expectations. The Russian 
energy sector is hard to understand, foreign companies have had a hard time entering and 
cooperating and the process of decision making is blurred. The same issues have plagued 
Chinese attempts at increased cooperation as they had poor experience with attempts to 
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cooperate, decision making saw unclear and did not know where to get their answers and at 
times felt used by the Russians. Trust and reliability is a significant part of Copeland‟s theory 
but if China is unable to measure and decipher Russia, it puts its trade expectations at risk. 
The closed Russian energy sector made it hard for China to understand and trust it leading to 
explore venues elsewhere.  
Long term supply possibility for China has been hampered by Russian dependence on 
Europe. This large dependence takes a lion‟s share of Russian production making it hard for 
Russia to diversify its demand. Even though it is in its interests, diversification means more 
commitments and investments which are inconvenient when compared to its current status. 
Europe being a more stable and high source of revenue, it is harder for Russia to diversify too 
much without risking its relations with its primary consumer. This automatically decreases 
the trade expectations for China and thus hindering the furthering of their energy trade in the 
period of 1993-2012.  
Finally, Russia‟s treatment of oil as a tool of power projection and foreign policy affects trade 
expectation and dependence unreliable and risky. Russia does not treat energy as a 
commodity, which made China question its reliability. This was seen in Russia‟s choice of 
building the ESPO pipeline despite discussions of a direct pipeline, as well as the disruptions 
caused by dispute with Ukraine. Such a move discredited Russia‟s ability to supply it energy 
without considering its foreign policy.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I have identified the major obstacles to increased trade to be the following and 
in order of importance. – Price, Infrastructure, Mistrust, Other Consumers/Suppliers and the 
use of Oil as Foreign Policy by Russia. These obstacles have all shown a contribution to trade 
expectations and dependence level. Despite being hindrances to trade in general they have 
been able to explain the low levels of trade in conjuncture with Copeland‟s theory of trade 
expectations. The Sino-Russian case in itself is quite compatible with the realist and liberal 
argumentation implemented in Copeland‟s perspective. As the project set out to do, it is quite 
evident now that the Sino-Russian energy trade has not only been stifled by economic 
reasoning but also political behaviour. Price and Infrastructure have been the biggest 
contributor to the hindrances, but lack of political will has not helped resolve these problems.  
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While liberal arguments account for the price and infrastructure, realist approach to mistrust, 
power projection and dependence also provide insight.  
From Copeland‟s perspective Russia does not project positive trade expectations for China 
due to its large dependence on Europe, but simultaneously China‟s price bargaining reduces 
the foreseeable gains for trading with China, which makes it more risky due to the European 
factor. Russia can also be seen to believe that Chinese dependence is risky, same as Turkey, 
in its move not to create a direct link or expanding exploration and production for it. Russia 
was observed to have wanted to tap the Chinese market in the 1990s when the prices were 
low, but since then it has found Europe more convenient. Also, China‟s large number of 
suppliers makes dependence with China more risky, as the initial costs and opportunity are 
quite high. But besides these, Russian trade expectation for China seem quite low as doubts 
over supply, resource nationalism and power project through oil did not instil much 
confidence in China‟s expectations from Russia during 1993-2012.                                  
After Thoughts 
This project is limited with resources and page limitations, but the subject area still remains 
fascinating. Even though the project is satisfactory further exploration in this relationship has 
potential. The period from 1993-2012 has been interesting and trade expectations can clearly 
been seen at play here, but the future is even more interesting. The chosen period had some 
major blockades such as price, infrastructure and European dependence, which makes the 
analysis more clear cut. With the new developments in infrastructure, it might be interesting 
to speculate if it will have a positive effect on further cooperation. With some infrastructure 
in place, European demands stagnating, and China‟s gas needs rising, Copeland‟s theory has 
large potential in this area.  
Russia‟s use of energy as foreign policy was seen at play the day before project submission 
when it offered Ukraine a partnership agreement to counter closeness with EU. In the 
agreement, apart from financial benefits, Russia offered to discount its gas prices by a third. 
Apart from this gas and oil deals were made in October 2013 between Russia and China. 
Therefore, the future marks a new scenario which is markedly different from the one 
analysed in this project. This opens up larger scope for research and even different results if 
this investigation were to be repeated in the future.           
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